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Findings 
 
Chapter 1 
A risk management (option) framework for monetary policy is set out in this thesis. The 
option’s approach is developed using the Derman and Taleb (2005) consistency argument 
which does not require continuous dynamic hedging to establish risk neutrality. The 
Derman and Taleb (2005) consistency argument is found to be robust even when the 
Black-Scholes (1973) assumptions relating to frictionless markets and Geometric Brownian 
motion are violated. The well-known no-arbitrage relationship, implied by put-call parity is 
used to establish risk neutral conditions and the time value of an inflation option portfolio is 
applied where merely static replication is thought possible. The inflation option portfolio is 
developed as a target variable for monetary policy. Initially, a lognormal random walk 
process is developed as a baseline analytic tool for considering inflation behavior and 
monetary policy reactions. This permits the risks to price stability from deflation to be 
construed as being minimal, while permitting the risk of hyperinflation to be preserved for 
policy analysis. Simulation of the lognormal process is extended to incorporate different 
upside and downside risks to inflation using Heston Monte Carlo. In chapter 2, deflation 
risks are also modeled using a Vasicek Monte Carlo model. 
 
The Aksoy et al. (2006) opportunistic framework can be extended to incorporate inflation 
risk. Using the option’s framework, set out in Proposition 1.4, it is found that under 
uncertainty policy makers will not remain inactive to changes in inflation even when 
inflation remains inside a desired target zone. The magnitude of this reaction is found to be 
sensitive to inflation volatility, the time horizon for preserving the target and to bandwidth. It 
is found that the parameter inputs associated with classic option pricing can be used to 
describe the conditions under which policy makers will remain responsive to expected 
inflation. That is, policy makers can increase the policy rate, even when expected inflation is 
below the upper bound of an opportunistic or zone targeting monetary policy framework. 
Departures of expected inflation from the lognormal model can be captured without violating 
the assertion of Proposition 1.4 that under uncertainty, Central Bankers can increase the 
policy rate even when expected inflation is below the upper bound. Monetary policy 
decisions that apply a risk management paradigm can incorporate varying levels of skew and 
kurtosis into forecasts by allowing the assumption of constant volatility to be relaxed. Heston 
inflation fan charts are generated and are used to demonstrate that the option’s framework 
when applied to monetary policy can be made flexible.  
 
Chapter 2 
The opportunistic approach to disinflation, as proposed by Aksoy et al. (2006) can be 
motivated alternatively by using institutional and committee dynamics. Even when individual 
members of the board or rate setting committee have individually adhered to linear rate 
setting, the dynamics of majority voting when policy makers disagree permit their collective 
behaviour to be characterised by nonlinear responses. Under opportunistic interest rate 
setting, the monetary policy response to inflation can also be modelled as the payoff from an 
option’s framework. Using this framework, the monetary policy response to expected 
inflation can be modelled as the intrinsic payoff from a portfolio of options when future 
inflation is known with certainty.  
 
A forward-looking opportunistic reaction function (a.2.1.16) which embeds an inflation 
option portfolio is derived in appendix A.2.1. This reaction function is specified for 
varying bounds, volatilities, data sets and is estimated for varying time periods using 
OLS. It is found that taking the entire Greenspan incumbency, or in part up to 2002, 
 xiii 
monetary policy responded more robustly when inflation threatened to exceed three 
percent. The 1% – 3% targeting specification appears to offer an improvement over the 
linear and other nonlinear representations of policy for real time forecasts and historic 
data sets that were subject to subsequent revision. 
 
The Delta of the collar option portfolio is developed to describe monetary policy 
inertia/activism (interest rate smoothing). The portfolio Delta is normally estimated to be 
minimised, when expected inflation resides within the strikes. This would suggest that 
monetary policy when guided by a risk management paradigm is generally least active or 
most graduated when expected inflation falls between the upper and lower target. A 
widening of the zone, between the exercise rates (i.e. greater disagreement between policy 
makers), precipitates greater nonlinearity and a lower policy response, ceteris paribus. A 
Vasicek delta is also developed to benchmark a number of asymmetries associated with the 
lognormal model. 
 
The Gamma of the collar portfolio is used to establish the level of expected inflation at which 
policy is least responsive to a change in expected inflation or where the policy rate 
adjustment is most graduated. Using the Black model, it is found that the expected inflation 
rate, associated with the lowest Delta, is inferior to the arithmetic average of the upper and 
lower bounds. This means that the Delta curve for the Black model is asymmetric. If the 
upper and lower bounds (strikes) are equal, this implies Gamma is zero and Delta is constant 
for all levels of expected inflation. That is, using Gamma it is possible to show that an agreed 
inflation point target produces a linear policy. 
 
In chapter 2, the option’s framework is extended to incorporate a wider set of inflation 
behaviours that would not be consistent with Black-Scholes. The parameter values of the 
Vasicek (1977) model can be selected to reflect varying degrees of central banker uncertainty 
and the speed of adjustment to a long term mean inflation rate. This implies that the option’s 
framework can be extended to a policy context where expected inflation is considered to be 
predictable/mean reverting and to incorporate the possibility of negative inflation. The 
Vasicek model permits the drift of the inflation process to be dependent on the policy 
instrument. In other words, expected inflation can be made to be endogenous to the rate 
decision. The Black model engenders a proportionately greater policy response as the 
underlying expected inflation rate increases. This can be benchmarked against the Vasicek 
model where policy responses defined by the Vasicek Delta are found to be symmetric. 
 
Chapter 3 
Nonlinear policy responses are supported by empirical evidence reported in chapters 2 and 3. 
The Taylor Rule nevertheless is still extremely relevant in a world where policy is conceived 
to be nonlinear. Using ‘the Greeks’ it was found that uncertainty can be shown to lessen 
nonlinearity. If policy makers agree the target level of inflation, then the policy rule becomes 
linear. Greater agreement produces a more conventional monetary policy response both 
under conditions of certainty and uncertainty.  
 
If the interest rate decision is designed to preserve price stability over a longer term, 
uncertainty regarding the future lessens the non-linearity of a path-dependent policy. By 
applying a number of benchmark measures from portfolio option theory, it is found that as 
the time horizon for containing inflation increases, the monetary policy response becomes 
increasingly linear. 
 
As inflation volatility increases the monetary policy response also becomes increasingly 
linear and less path dependent. 
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Abstract 
 
Taylor (1993) advocated that the short term policy rate should respond linearly to the 
inflation rate and to the output gap. The Taylor Rule also seemed to track the federal 
funds rate over the formative years of the Greenspan regime, then considered to have 
experienced a number of early successes. While acknowledged as being simple and 
robust, the Taylor Rule does not, however, capture the nonlinearity of monetary policy as 
expressed by a number of Federal Reserve ‘insiders’. In this thesis, the argument is made 
that as monetary aggregates were being de-emphasised from the early 1980s, some policy 
makers felt it was necessary to preserve latitude for economic shocks. From the late 
1980s opportunistic monetary policy, devised by FOMC members, has been used to 
expound policy judgements that reflected a more discretionary posture. Chairman 
Greenspan also used risk management rhetoric to explain deviations from a conventional 
linear framework. Within this framework, discretion can be achieved by crafting the 
inflation forecast and the zone targeting bounds. The opportunistic reaction function as 
set out by Aksoy, Orphanides, Small, Wieland and Wilcox (2006) is augmented to take 
into account risk management perspectives using portfolio option theory. This reaction 
function is estimated and found to offer some improvement in describing rate decisions 
over a linear Taylor reaction function for the Greenspan tenure. Risk management 
implies policy makers pre-emptively target the expectation of inflation. Portfolio option 
theory is used to extend the opportunistic model as set out by Aksoy et al. (2006) and 
from this a number of parameter sensitivities, better known as ‘the Greeks’, are 
developed. The Greeks are used innovatively to consider how rate adjustment is likely to 
be affected by altering varying measures of uncertainty. In particular, delta is developed 
to provide a dynamic measure of interest rate inertia. Portfolio option theory and 
committee dynamics are also used to describe under what circumstances a linear Taylor 
type rule can also constitute the de facto policy rule, even for rate setting with a very 
defined zone target. As a consequence, the nonlinearity described by the portfolio option 
model is found to be highly nuanced. The impact of increasing uncertainty when policy is 
pre-emptive largely serves to reduce the effect of nonlinearity.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
